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ABSTRACT 
 The agri-food sector has been undergoing rapid changes in the areas of food 
production and distribution over the past decades. Over the years, the sector has moved 
from disconnected, independent and uncoordinated operations to a highly interconnected, 
dependent and coordinated operations that have enhanced efficiency.  The principal cost of 
this highly efficient system of production is the increased complexity and the exposure to 
potential risks networked organizations face in the age of the fourth industrial revolution.  
Increasingly, the physical value of the agri-food sector’s activities has declined even as the 
intangibles (data, information, insights) have increased in value. As precision agriculture 
becomes the mainstream and global positioning systems and RFIDs are deployed to 
enhance traceability and safety, the importance of data protection and security also become 
exponentially critical to the integrity of the system. That the sector is ahead of the general 
economy in the adoption of autonomous machines and artificial intelligence implies that 
the crucial valuation in the sector would be on data generation, organization and analytics, 
and machine learning.  The combined complexity of these systems and processes 
interacting together create value and at the same time exposes the industry to significant 
operational risks.  For while it was much difficult for cows and grains of corn to be stolen, 
stealing the data supporting the value embedded in these commodities is becoming 
increasing easy and riskier. 
 This research is an exploratory excursion into developing an awareness of the scope 
of the potential risks creeping into the agri-food sector. It raises concern about the nature, 
typology and structure of these cybersecurity risks, that identifies the skills and capabilities 
 
 
that are needed for the sector to continue producing value to its customers even as it 
sustains its competitiveness. It focuses attention on building the internal capacities along 
the agri-food supply chain to ensure that all stakeholders have the appropriate capabilities 
and capacities to address the impending and emerging challenges. After all, every chain is 
as strong as its weakest link.  Cybersecurity threat has become a very critical challenge 
facing all businesses. And the agri-food sector is not immune to the threats it presents. 
Being prepared is a necessary condition for securing the sector’s future.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 About 25 years ago, a new wave swept the world: information age was born. From 
entertainment to work, communication to industry, information gained currency and began 
to become critical to the competitiveness of business organizations (Mata, Furest and 
Barney 1995). It is important to recognize that the information age did not begin in the 
1990s. Rather, it was the deployment of technology to facilitate the application of existing 
information, that enabled the development of new data, which could be transformed into 
new information, that created the novel opportunities that became part of the 
competitiveness structure of organizations.  One of the major changes that happened with 
the information revolution was the migration of corporate and personal information from 
filing cabinets to cyberspace – servers that could be several thousand miles away from 
companies’ physical locations.  
 The development of rapid deposit and retrieval technologies enabled the embedded 
transaction costs associated with the adoption and use of these technologies to fall rapidly 
through the years. The effect of this lowering of cost of use was massive adoption.  Slowly, 
technologies that were previously only available to large, well-resourced organizations, 
became available to everyone, including individuals in their homes. They became available 
globally, allowing Chinese firms to provide near real-time service to their US clients, and 
Indian software developers to work on projects in the US as if they lived there. Information 
technology became the leveler in a world of massive inequalities.   
 As more companies jumped on the information revolution bandwagon, the inherent 
risks and opportunities associated with new technologies and massive adoptions began to 
2 
 
emerge. As expected, the focus in the early days was on building and improving these 
novel communication technologies that allowed massive transfer of data from one 
organization to another at virtually no costs across organizations in very distant locations. 
Little thought was put into the potential risks that would become obvious to any individual 
or organization who sought to exploit the weaknesses of the technologies for profit or 
power. As the technology became more universal, questions of privacy protection, data 
security and “viruses” and “malware” became more rampant.  A new term emerged in the 
business lexicon: cybersecurity.   
1.1 Cybersecurity Defined 
 It is important to note that curiosity was the foundation of a lot of the tools that later 
became part of criminal activity in cyberspace.  Cybersecurity is reputed to have its origin 
in a research project done by Bob Thomas, who observed that it was possible for a 
computer program to move across computer networks while leaving a small trail along the 
way.  To test his idea, Thomas wrote a program he christened Creeper, and served between 
Tenex terminals on the early ARPANET, printing the message “IM CREEPER: CATCH 
ME IF YOU CAN.”  Ray Tomlinson, the inventor of email, saw Thomas’ Creeper and 
liked it, tinkered with it and gave birth to the first computer worm when he made the 
Creeper self-replicating. Tomlinson then wrote the first antivirus program to deal with the 
problem he has contributed to creating and called it Reaper. Reaper’s job was to chase 
Creeper and delete it. It was all brilliant people exploring the limits of the emerging 
technology. No harm intended.  As noted by SentinelOne (2019), “It’s funny to look back 
from where we are now, in an era of ransomware, fileless malware, and nation-state 
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attacks, and realize that the antecedents to this problem were less harmful than simple 
graffiti.”  
 A German computer hacker, Marcus Hess, hacked an internet gateway in Berkeley 
in 1986, using it to piggyback on the ARPANET, which allowed him to hack 400 military 
computers, including Pentagon mainframes.  This was not a research project: Hess’ intent 
was to sell the information to the KGB, the Russian intelligence agency. It needs to be 
acknowledged that the Russians had recognized the potential of the emerging internet 
technology as a potential weapon in cyber warfare. Astronomer Clifford Stoll detected the 
intrusion and deployed a honeypot technique, which led to catching Hess. Computer 
viruses and worms were becoming less of academic research activities and pranks and were 
quickly evolving into serious threat. Increasing network connectivity made the potential 
threat presented by those with criminal intent in this field more dangerous.  For example, 
an early computer worm, the Morris, nearly wiped out the early internet, giving birth to the 
creation of the antivirus software industry. It is important to note that the author of what 
became known as the Morris worm did not have any criminal intent.  He wanted to gauge 
the size of the internet, and his program was meant to propagate across networks, copying 
itself as it travelled. The program, which became known as the Morris worm, propagated so 
aggressively that it brought the early internet to a crawl, causing massive damage. Morris’ 
“research” made him the first to be prosecuted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
but it led to the formation of the non-profit US Computer Emergency Response Team, now 
housed within Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the Department 
of Homeland Security with a $93 million budget (2013).  From this simple beginning, thus 
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emerged a global computer virus and malware industry, which by 2014 was estimated to 
produce about half a million new and unique malwares were produced daily, up from the 5 
million that was happening per annum in 2007. The biggest of these malwares to date was 
the WannaCry ransomware, which emerged on May 12, 2017 and within 24 hours infected 
more than 230,000 computers in 150 countries (SentinelOne 2019).  
 That is the brief history of factors and forces that have given birth to a novel 
industry in the age of networks, data transfers and Big Data activities at the personal and 
organizational levels around the world: Cybersecurity.  What, then, is cybersecurity? Let us 
explore the definition and meaning of cybersecurity from its roots.  Cyber comes from 
cybernetics, which has its roots in the Greek word kubernētēs, from kubernan (to steer or 
control). Cybernetics is the field of study that compares the control and communication 
systems of the body with mechanical or electronic systems of control and communication.  
It is about human control and control and communication systems and the electronic and 
mechanical systems designed to replace them. Therefore, cybersecurity is a shortened for 
of cybernetic security – the protection of electronic and mechanical systems of control and 
communication designed to replace human systems of communication and control from 
potential adverse event.  The US CISA (2009) notes that “Cybersecurity is the art of 
protecting networks, devices, and data from unauthorized access or criminal use and the 
practice of ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.” Therefore, 
cybersecurity encompasses activities aimed at the protection of computer systems, devices 
from the theft and damage to hardware and software programs or electronic data, as well as 
the disruption or misdirection of services that they provide. 
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1.2 Research Problem 
 The agri-food sector has been involved in the adoption of information technology to 
manage production, processing, transportation, distribution and retailing of commodities 
and food products for decades.  Agri-food supply chains are increasingly becoming 
interconnected as efficiency in communicating and controlling inventory at different stages 
in the supply chain enables effective achievement of customer satisfaction, enhance 
customer loyalty and improve profitability and competitiveness. The increasing networking 
of agri-food companies involves the sharing of massive amounts of data across computer 
networks. And this sharing creates the environment for cybersecurity risks and the 
necessity of pondering cybersecurity strategies. 
 It is important to observe that while the focus of cybersecurity has been on 
nefarious intents of criminals, some cybersecurity risks are accidents arising from 
carelessness on the part of individual employees across the spectrum of power in 
organizations. Whether they arise from nefarious intents or through negligence or 
carelessness of trusted employees, cybersecurity in the agri-food sector can disrupt 
organization’s activities across their supply chains, put their reputation and goodwill at risk, 
and have direct significant impact on their financial health. It is for this reason that 
assessing the risks facing agri-food companies in the age of cybersecurity risks is 
appropriate and timely. Unfortunately, there is little to no work in this area in the literature. 
The imperativeness of bringing some focus to this problem is expected to help the agri-
food sector develop a collective, systematic and strategic approach to the challenges (and 
opportunities) presented by cybersecurity.  
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1.3 Research Question 
 Given the foregoing problem, the question motivating this research is this:  What is 
the various cybersecurity risk facing the US agri-food companies and how may they 
mitigate these risks? This question is driven by the need to classify the different 
cybersecurity risks to which the agri-food sector is exposed and developing a systematic 
approach to dealing with each of them.  It is hoped that this research would raise awareness 
about the risks associated with cybersecurity in the agri-food sector and encourage those 
who have not yet taken steps to address these risks to begin taking it seriously.  
 The importance of acting on this challenge is that because of the increasing 
networking of organizations in the sector – from producers and their input suppliers to 
retailers and their customers – potential partner organizations are going to assess each 
other’s security risks before engaging them in non-atomistic relationships. This implies that 
those without strong security systems in place will find themselves on the outside looking 
into structured supply chain relationships.  
1.4 Research Objectives 
 From the foregoing research problem and research question, the overall objective of 
this research is to develop a comprehensive catalog of cybersecurity risks facing the agri-
food sector with the view to developing pragmatic, effective and competitiveness-
enhancing responses to them using existing and potential solutions.  The specific objectives 
are as follows: 
1. Explore the extent of cybersecurity risks in the US and extrapolate the 
cybersecurity risks facing the agri-food sector. 
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2. Classify the current and potential cybersecurity risks facing the agri-food 
sector and assess their potential implications on the US sector’s 
competitiveness. 
3. Develop a comprehensive strategy for enhancing the cybersecurity of the 
agri-food sector with the view of enhancing the competitiveness of US agri-
food firms.  
1.5 Overview of Methods 
 The research uses an extensive literature review to explore the extent of 
cybersecurity risks in the US.  It uses a keywork and impact analysis to classify the 
identified risks into coherent groups.  Using examples from other industries, it will assess 
the potential effect of these risks on the agri-food sector using simulations.  Finally, it will 
draw on Kim and Mauborgne (2015) to explore strategic initiatives that may be employed 
by agri-food firms to not only manage their cybersecurity risks but thrive in an increasingly 
networked economy.  
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
 This chapter presented the background and justification for the research.  The next 
chapter presents a review of the literature to address the first objective. It also presents the 
classification system and uses it to classify the identified cybersecurity risks facing agri-
food firms.  It provides an overview of the potential implications of these risks to the US 
agri-food sector’s competitiveness. That chapter covers the second objective.  The third 
chapter addresses the issue of dealing with cybersecurity, developing a typology of the 
areas that need to be covered. It focuses at its end on the steps that might be used to 
mitigate the identified risks cyber insecurity presents to the agri-food sector.   
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CHAPTER II: CYBERSECURITY LITERATURE – SELECTED OVERVIEW 
 In this chapter, an overview of the computer network usage and its attendant 
problems of cybersecurity are presented and discussed.  The chapter also explores 
specifically the expansion adoption of internet technologies in the agri-food sector, 
exploring the transformational initiatives that internet of things (IOT) and other dimensions 
of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) are introducing to the sector and how the sector is 
positioning to succeed in this emerging environment.  
 The chapter is organized into four sections. The first presents an overview of 
cybersecurity risks in the US. The second addresses how these cybersecurity risks manifest 
in the agri-food sector. The third section traces the path that has led to this point and 
explore where the agri-food sector is going within the scheme of events happening in the 
general economy.  The final section illustrates how the increasing connectivity across 
devices and organizations exacerbates the cybersecurity risks, arguing that disengagement 
is not an option if one seeks to secure and enhance competitiveness. 
2.1 Cybersecurity Risks  
There is no shortage of risks in the global environment these days, particularly in issues 
that concerns connectivity in the world order. With the tensions between the US and North 
Korea, China and Russia, the targets for cybersecurity risks may be divided into two broad 
groups: (1) Personal and commercial entities risks aimed at stealing information that may 
be deployed for the gain of those perpetrating the security breaches; and (2) Government 
entities for the sake of humiliating or controlling adversaries for political gain.  In the 
second group is what has come to be recognized as cyber-terrorism.  It is projected that 
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cybercrimes will cost more than $6 trillion by 2021, making it more profitable than all the 
global trade in illicit drugs combined. This estimate includes damage and destruction to 
data, lost productivity, theft of intellectual property, post attack disruption to the normal 
course of doing business, forensic investigation, reputational harm and restoration 
(Cybersecurity Ventures, 2019). 
 Cyberterrorism is a “premeditated, politically motivated attack against information 
and computer systems, computer programs and data that results in violence against non-
combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents” (Tafoya 2011).  The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published a report on the subject of 
cyber-terror, which argued that it is “the use of computer network tools to shut down 
critical national infrastructures (e.g., energy, transportation, government operations) or to 
coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population” (Lewis 2002, 1). Lewis goes on 
to say this of cyber-terrorism: “the intimidation of civilian enterprise through the use of 
high technology to bring about political, religious, or ideological aims, actions that result in 
disabling or deleting critical infrastructure data or information.”  
Social Engineering attacks: This is a skill set process that hackers use to psychologically 
manipulate businesses and people in general., in giving away sensitive information. A 
common form of this attack is phishing. It is a ticklish deceptive email that tricks the 
potential receiver in giving out sensitive and vital information. 
Advanced persistent threat (APT): These are basically attack in which hackers or 
unauthorized users get into / infiltrate your network without your consent for a long period 
of time. The essence of this type of attack is to still company and individual data, here we 
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are talking about sensitive agricultural data, company trade secrets that competitors can use 
against you to have an edge over you. This type of attack is prevalent where there is high 
volume of information. It is in most cases to still data and not to harm the network. 
Malware: This is a software that is designed to enable access into a network and cause 
damage without the knowledge of the authorized owner. There does exist various types of 
malware, Virus, keyloggers, worms, trojan horses, spyware, ransomware (Sykuta 2016). 
Some of these malwares do propagate themselves without user intervention. They start by 
taking advantage of any software vulnerability. Once a computer is infected, the malware 
begins to replicate itself throughout the network. It does come through network-based 
software, emails and websites.  Some malwares pretend to be what they are not. There are 
situations where a software that is supposed to help speed up computer networks will 
disguise and then steal company trade secrets, delivering them to a remote intruder. 
Viruses and worms can self-replicate and damage files and systems, while trojans and 
spyware are often used for surreptitious data collection. Ransomware waits for the 
opportunity to encrypt user’s information (holding them hostage) and demanding ransom 
payment (hence the name). Release of the encryption code is only done upon receipt of 
payment, which is often demanded by done in cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin.  Malwares 
are often distributed through legitimate looking emails or email attachments (Kaspersky, 
2019).  
Denial of Service (DOS): In this type of cyber-attack, the attacker’s intension is to make 
the machine or network resource unavailable to intended users by indefinitely or 
temporarily disrupting services to a host connected to the internet. This is done by flooding 
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the targeted machine or resource with overwhelming request to overload system and 
deprive legitimate request from being fulfilled or accomplished. Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDOS) is even worse because it uses multiple systems to flood the bandwidth or 
resource of a targeted system, usually one or more web servers. 
2.2 Possible Avenues for Cyber-Attacks and the Agri-Food Sector 
 Cyber-attacks may occur through various avenues in the agri-food sector.  
However, it is important to note that the agri-food sector is not unique in the way cyber-
attacks are manifested.  The four possible avenues through which cyber-attacks can occur 
are as follows: (1) Disruption of delivery; (2) The interception of confidential information; 
(3) Alteration of formulations; and (4) Tampering threats.  
 Disruption of delivery involves intentional actions taken to interfere with the 
physical or virtual delivery of products and/or services. In the cyber environment, this 
could occur by interfering maliciously with control systems and information systems to 
disrupt the delivery of products and services to clients or downstream partners of a supply 
chain. While physical threats to delivery of agri-food products through the supply chain 
have been minimal to absent to date, the risks in the cyber environment can be immense.  
By disrupting delivery through misdirection or misinformation, highly perishable agri-food 
products can be wasted, creating significant financial losses to companies on both sides of 
the delivery process. Likewise, such actions can engender mistrust in suppliers as credible 
and dependable, causing an erosion of confidence, which can carry significant reputational 
and business costs.   
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 Disruption of delivery can also be used strategically in cyber warfare.  For example, 
criminals or state agents working remotely to alter delivery location instructions can cause 
a lot of confusion in the supply chain.  Imagine a small restaurant receiving on its dock a 
56-foot trailer of milk that should have gone to a Club store in a location clear across the 
country, and that club store receiving a box of crackers that was meant for a consumer on 
the other side of the country.  By aggressively undertaking these disruptions, the attacker 
creates confusion and panic even as it increases operating costs and reduces 
competitiveness across the sector.  These issues are being contemplated by the Department 
of Energy and Department of Homeland Security as they pursue protection of the computer 
systems and networks upon which the delivery of electricity and other energy are delivered 
to distribution companies for onward distribution to consumers across the country.   
 Whenever a user is on a web page completing a form, there is a risk that someone 
interested in the information being provided might attempt to intercept its delivery to the 
intended recipient and capture it for their own use.  Its value is often real because there is 
often ready market for such information, allowing the intercepting criminals to benefit 
almost instantaneously from their actions.  Interception of confidential information also 
involves hacking into companies’ computers to retrieve confidential information that are 
stored there. Information, such as credit card information, and client information such as 
social security numbers, have significant value to criminals who want to use them for 
incurring debt or procuring services in other people’s names.  These information theft 
activities form the foundation of identity theft, a crime that costs about $1,343 per victim 
and estimated to affect almost 20 million US residents in 2014 (Harrell 2017).  Identity 
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theft was estimated in the Harrell paper to be increasing in all categories – credit cards, 
bank accounts, personal information, etc.   Figure 2.1 is the cumulative trend of exposed 
records between 2014 and 2018.  By the end of the data, nearly 4 billion records had been 
exposed in the US.  These numbers do not include the US Government’s exposure.  
Additionally, experts believe the numbers here presented are only a fraction of the true size 
and extent of the problem because many companies do not report their exposures.   
Figure 2.1: Cumulative Number of Exposed Records in the US between 2014 and 
2018 (Excluding Government) 
 
Source: Bloomberg, 2019 
Figure 2.1 includes confidential information harvested from the retail giant, Target, and the 
ag chemical giant, Monsanto.  It includes Cambridge Analytica’s harvest of more than 50 
million user profiles from Facebook. Cambridge Analytica’s approach was simple but 
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effective.  They built a quiz app and used it to collect profile and other data from those 
completing the quiz as well their friends and their friends’ friends who had nothing to do 
with the quiz.  This illustrates how competitors may intercept information of commercial 
and competitive value and use them to their advantage in client acquisition and market 
share development (Norton, MacAfee).  Examples of how this may be accomplished for 
commercial purposes were seen in the 2016 Presidential elections.  
 Alteration of formulation can present significant risks exceeding those presented by 
those already presented.  Imagine a nefarious organization or individual altering the 
formulation for a pharmaceutical product in ways that cause harm to consumers using such 
products and hijacking the quality assurance process to mask the alterations.  Depending on 
the objective of the individual criminal., the impact can be instant, rapid or very slow. The 
slower the impact, the longer it will take the authorities to discover the alteration in the 
product. Such a risk negates the warning the pharmaceutical companies put on their 
consumer-packaged goods – “discard if seal is broken”.  The risk occurs in the 
manufacturing process and through the quality assurance activities.   The foregoing is 
feasible because of programmable logic controllers (PLC).  These are industrial digital 
computers that have been ruggedized and adapted for the control of manufacturing 
processes, such as assembly lines, robotic devices, or any activity that requires high 
reliability control and ease of programming and process fault diagnosis (Wikipedia). 
 This example of what can happen in the pharmaceutical industry can happen in 
food manufacturing industries as more of product formulations and production are 
automated through networked systems. Opportunities for cyberattacks, their nature and 
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extent, are driven by the objectives of the attacker.  However, as suggested by Joshua 
Cooper Ramos in his book Thinking the Unthinkable, failing to explore the different 
combinations of the unthinkable puts the “good guys” in a reaction mode all the time, 
chasing the “bad guys.”  It is time for new and novel minds to explore radically dangerous 
scenarios as they build systems to protect the agri-food systems from the potential risks that 
cyber-attackers may use to unleash havoc on the food production, manufacturing and 
distribution system.  
 Data tampering is simply the changing (including insertions and deletions) of how a 
programming code is expected to behave.  In lot of ways, it is biggest of all the cyber-
attack threats. Tampering involves other activities, such as interceptions. The criminal 
intercepts an unprotected packet of instruction that is being transmitted over a network, and 
modifies its contents, or changes its destination address. The intruder can also introduce 
malicious instructions that can cause significant havoc for industries and governments.  
Since tampering begins with intrusion and then interception, it is important to think 
backwards and figure out how to prevent intrusions so that malicious tampering scan be 
prevented.   
 There is a subset of cyberattacks by cyber activist. These are the group that would 
disagree with a company’s product or the method that a company uses to produce a 
product. Individuals or groups of this nature have the tendency to use hacking to attack and 
tannish a company’s reputation, maliciously modify its automated processes, disrupt its 
operations and cause damage. 
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 These attacks can be perpetrated from and in anywhere in the world. There is 
obviously no requirement for anyone involved in cyberattacks to even set foot in the 
facility that is being attacked. That makes it more frightening.  Because of the foregoing, it 
will be proper to say that the agri-food industry has no choice but to guard against potential 
cyber-attacks. Unfortunately, it is not the case as would be expected, surprisingly. Several 
factors could be the reason why this is the situation as of now.  They include a lack of 
awareness of the problem, incomplete and inadequate appreciation of the challenges, and 
connectivity loopholes, or inadequate security systems.  
 Let us begin with lack of awareness. Breaches in the food industries would not be 
noticeable initially, when compared to a machinery or equipment that is not functioning, or 
a flooring or roof in a factory that needs repairs. In most industries including the agri-food 
industry, protection of the computerized system resource wise is not in their priority list. 
They tend to pay more attention to budgets that pertains to productivity and improvement 
of food safety and quality before focusing on cybersecurity, particularly in companies that 
have never been attacked by hackers. This lack of focus towards cybersecurity can result to 
system vulnerability in the agri-food industry.  Included in vulnerability of this nature is the 
operating systems that could be corrupted, insecure remote access portals, outdated 
firewalls and even employees that have little or no training whatsoever and not aware of the 
danger of potential risk as it relates to cyber-attacks. 
 Another aspect of this lack of appreciation of the challenges is that firms that do 
have defense mechanisms in place against cyber-attacks, tend to often pay more attention 
to their database systems, and overlook the possibility of professional hackers utilizing 
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innovative methods and indirect access methods, through third party to bypass the gates 
(entry point) to gain access to company secret data that could be damaging to an agri-food 
firm being attacked. These are systems the concerned firm had assumed to be secure. 
 Risk exposure to cyber-attacks also emanate from the assumption that processes of 
protecting and recovering networks, devises and programs from any form of cyber-attacks 
are intact. Cyber-attacks are dangerous to organizations, their consumers, and employees. 
These attacks are designed to access and destroy sensitive data or extort money (Norton). 
They can damage business practices and their reputations.   
 The connectivity in the agri-food sector includes control over the means of 
information, transportation of physical goods and services as well as intangibles, such as 
computer codes for equipment and facilities.  This have become increasingly ubiquitous as 
organizations operate in the Fourth Industrial Revolution O Industry 4.0 (Figure 2.2). In 
this industrial era, which is reputed to have started around the turn of the current century, 
organizations are operating on cyber physical systems. It involves connected systems that 
utilize big data and augmented analytical processes to achieve business objectives.  
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Figure 2.2: Progression of the Industrial Revolutions and their Main Characteristics 
 
It uses augmented reality and cloud computing to provide insights into customer decisions 
and preferences, helping organizations improve customer satisfaction.  The adoption and 
use of smart sensors, location detection technologies, mobile devices and multilevel 
customer interactions and profiling to improve supply chain effectiveness and value 
creation is the expected outcomes. It involves the digitization of products such that 
manufacturing can be done on demand and customized using such technologies as 3D 
printing.  Transparency in business models and improved interactions with customers and 
suppliers are at the core of the business models under 4IR. And it is also in this enhanced 
connectivity and transparent interactions that organizations become vulnerable to cyber-
attacks and cybersecurity risks.  
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 The critical cybersecurity risks facing the agri-food sector are recognized by those 
charged with overseeing the country’s systems and cybersecurity. For example, the   
Department of Homeland Security has labeled the agri-food sector among the 16 national 
critical infrastructures. Thus, just as technological advances have enhanced productivity, 
and provided the agri-food sector with new opportunities, it is here argued that increased 
connectivity and the characteristics of the 4IR present heretofore unimagined risks to the 
sector. For example, computer usage at the primary production level has increased 
significantly over the past decade, with most farm information providers delivering via 
smart phones and other connected devices.  That is how the connectivity exposes the 
industry to these risks.  However, most of these risks are known and have been researched 
in other industries.  The challenge is taking the results of those research products and 
adapting them to fit the unique characteristics of the agri-food sector.  
2.3 Cybersecurity in the Agri-Food Sector 
 The pace at which technology is evolving is unbelievably fast and amazing, the 
agri-food industry is constantly faced with adoption choices. It is vital to examine the 
technologies that are been used and how they are been implemented in various industries, 
particularly the agri-food industry. As these technologies continue to proliferate, the agri-
food industry and the billions of people it serves globally are increasingly at risk from 
cyber-attack threats. (Molly et al., 2019). 
 It is a known fact that agri-food industries are becoming dependent on information 
networks. These are the same networks that have been recognized to be responsible for the 
new risk in nearly all facet of modern life, resulting from cyber vulnerabilities that may 
potentially have global scale impacts in different dimensions. For example, John Deere 
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combines are now connected to the networks, allowing operators to remotely check engine 
conditions and operational productivity (Schemper 2014).   
 It is also important to be aware of one of the reasons behind this competition for 
technological competition in agri-food sector, it is because of the economic backdrop, 
farmers are now been pressured to pursue higher per-acre productivity and a lower 
operating cost to stay in business (USDA/ERS, 2017). Because of the pursuit in achieving 
these goals and the challenging market situation with the environmental factors, this has 
resulted to increase in the demand for highly connected smart devices in the agri-food 
industry. This is applicable to its supply chain, distribution systems, smart production and 
smart market systems, thus opening and increasing channels for cyber-attacks. 
 These technologies we now call “precision agriculture” is where smart devices 
integrate with smart markets, enabling timely allocation and more precise farm resources in 
times of growing, harvest and transportation of agricultural products off the farm. Precision 
agriculture has been confirmed to raise production efficiency. (FAO,2017). By its 
improved and efficient use of inputs (water, crop nutrients, seeds, pesticide, herbicides, 
fertilizer and others), production efficiency is raised, thus increasing production per acre. 
(Clearly, 2017). This is obviously a game changer in the agri-food industry. With all that 
been said, it is important to realize that any smart technology, no matter how good it is, if 
not properly secured, also inclusive is smart markets, if not monitored severely may result 
to disaster. That is to say that hackers will take advantage of the lapses and cause havoc to 
food distribution by manipulating the system. Just to mention a few that could be 
manipulated, robotic milkers, autonomous, agricultural planters, harvesters, cultivators, the 
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application of herbicide, pesticides, fertilizer, driver less tractors and trucks for delivery 
that are in the making etc. 
 All these technologies are geared towards enabling farmers to be more focused on 
managing and planning their activities, from planting, cultivating, and harvesting to 
transportation, delivery, payment and processing of their product. (Brown, 2018).  
 U.S agri-food is routinely studied and adopted around the globe. This makes the 
translation and application of data-driven technologies for autonomous systems, precision 
agriculture, data recording, yield large data sets of economic and bio-based information for 
agri-food industry. (Sykuta, 2016). Because of the high throughput processing nature, data 
management and integration and other management of computer-based management of 
these data, there have been advances in decision processes, increase in efficiencies, and 
increase in output within the agri-food industry. Notably, information of this nature is 
susceptible to theft, ownership policy challenges and cyber-attacks, because users are not 
aware to the potential vulnerability or lack of training in respect to effective security and 
protection strategies. (Sykuta, 2016; Bogosian et al., 2018). There is the possibility that 
unprotected and even weakly protected systems in the agri-food industries will obviously 
be susceptible to intrusions and unwanted attacks through surveillance and tendency for 
potential malicious cyber- attacks. These cyber threats could include unwanted access to 
analytical technologies, vital data, access to systems, and the improper use of stolen 
information to cause harm in areas of research, production, processing , advanced breeding, 
high performance livestock, high yielding and specialty agricultural crops , bio technology 
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advancement and even big data analyses etc.( National Academics For Sciences, 
Engineering and Medicine, 2014). 
 It is good to realize that the agri-food industry also applies to military food 
production, involving manufactured packaged meals for soldiers which has the tendency 
for sabotage. (Colbert et al., 2018). Attackers don’t have to know the in depth of the food 
manufacturing process, all they need to know is the technical methods needed in exploiting 
the machinery or the process that is in place, such as the ability to lower the temperatures 
on meat cookers before packaging remotely (Colbert et al., 2015). 
 There has been a paradigm shift since the incorporation of cyber-based technologies 
and data-based solutions in farm production, food processing, transport goods, supplier 
industries, marketing sales, communication with consumers. (Boghossian et al., 2018). 
Also to be aware of, is the use of cloud based storage of large data sets, the use of open 
sourced or internet and cloud based software and cooperate based management of 
proprietary software, these have each increased the chances of unauthorized access to vital 
data in the agri-food industry. The use of research laboratories, biological and genetically 
analyzed technologies are very widespread for the evaluation of food quality, animal and 
plant health inclusive, which are enhancing the rate of new products. (United States 
Department of Agriculture National Institute for Food and Agriculture, 2016; Wintle et al., 
2017). All these can create cyber-attack threats which can in turn harm public trust in the 
industry. When the above is the case according to strategist, they may cause more harm 
than the actual threat itself. (Wintle et al., 2017). 
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The FBI (2017) has warned against the increase threat of cyber-attacks in the agricultural 
industry towards the following: 
The targeting by cyber criminals towards seeking to steal farm level data in 
bulk. Also targeted by these cyber thieves is the aggregated and analyzed 
data to exploit U.S agricultural resources and its market trends. 
Also included in the report is the targeting of farm level equipment that collects data about 
soil content and past crop yields, including planting recommendations.  Additionally, the 
report identifies hacking of public worldwide climate and crop data that is used to design 
visualization tools for farmers. Also, in their agenda is the susceptibility to ransomware and 
data destruction. Finally, drone manufacturers that are focused on offering low pricing 
structures for farmers by using systems that are interoperable with networked devices with 
poor cyber security protections.  
 As the agri-food industry increase its reliability on digitized data and the increase in 
the sophistication of hackers and cyber threat mode of operation increasing, most major 
agri-food industry and farm equipment providers are investing in stronger cyber security. 
Monsanto is amongst companies in this sector working to improve its cyber defenses after 
it had acquired farm analytics, the climate corporation had a cyber-attack in 2014. 
(Homeland Security Newswire, 2014).  It was also reported that the agri-food sector will be 
facing increased cyber-attack threats, because of the growing adoption services and that 
they are collecting and analyzing data from farms, inclusive is soil content and the crop 
yields and other planting recommendations. (Wall Street Journal., 2015). 
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 The US Council of Economic Advisers (2018) did report that the agricultural sector 
had 11 cyber-attacks incidences in 2016. Many security experts believe that the integration 
of the IoT (Internet of things) with combination of blockchain technology, which can create 
a verified, distributed ledger will be capable of improving security, which will enable 
proper and more reliable tracking in relation to the smart devices/systems. (Petracec, 
Nelson, 2018). This makes it more difficult for hackers to break in.  This is possible 
because the possibility of a single point failure is eliminated because of the cryptographic 
encryption technology distributed across many verifying nodes that is entailed in the 
storing of the shared data in the blockchain (Banafa Ahmed, 2016) 
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CHAPTER III: DEALING WITH CYBER SECURITY THREATS 
 
 This chapter presents some strategic approaches that may be used to address the 
challenges associated with cybersecurity presented in the preceding chapters of this thesis. 
The chapter is organized into four sections. The first and the second sections look at 
dealing with the threat to confidentiality and to integrity.  The third section looks at 
addressing the threat to availability.  The final section explores the broader challenges of 
mitigating cybersecurity threats, serving as a summary of the discussion presented in the 
chapter.  
3.1 Threat to Confidentiality  
 Data privacy is very important in precision agriculture implementation and agri-
food industry in general. It is vital for farmers to be protective of their information, such as 
land prices, yield data, herd and crop health. Any form of tampering or loss and even 
misuse of these data can have a catastrophic effect to the emotional and financial impacts 
on farmers. There is also the potential for reputational negative effect against equipment 
and software manufacturers. Other threats in this category include the following. 
3.1.1 Unfairly unauthorized use to confidential data 
 Confidential information/data could be used negatively against farmers on the 
commodity market, which would have a damaging effect. There has been evidence of data 
sales on the black web market online. There also exist sales to hedge funds and commodity 
brokers in the past. 
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3.1.2 Publishing confidential information that could be damaging from suppliers 
 The possibility and potential by a supplier to publish information such as market 
data and confidential pricing of famers could be disastrous to any business and agri-food 
industry. This can lead to loss of trust and exodus of customers, resulting in drop of profit 
margin. An example of this type of attack is the incidence with Sony pictures in 2014. 
3.1.3 The intentional data theft and/ unintentional data leakage 
 Occurrences of this nature has been on the increase in the industry particularly in 
relation to mobile apps, that are designed to support farmers. Most of these apps were built 
by university extension programs who do outsource their programming, also startups that 
may not be patching for updates. User agreements, privacy controls, third party 
applications, systems update, and others are not properly done. Some of these apps are 
designed intentionally to still vital data. This is a threat not to be taken likely. 
3.2 Integrity  
 The agri-food industry regarding precision agriculture has moved tremendously 
into smart farming. Massive sensors are been built both in crop and livestock sectors 
respectively. Of vital importance, is the collection of data, and its exploitation is considered 
a valuable tool in assisting real time farming and livestock decisions. Because of the quick 
pace precision agriculture has adopted robotics, machine learning, edge computing, 
equipment automation, there has been a sharp increase to threats of data integrity like has 
never been seen in the agri-food industry. This is to be taken seriously. 
3.2.1 Rogue data introduction into network 
 Smart sensor implementation is deepest in crops like vegetables, fruits and nuts. 
These sensors are connected through blue tooth, WI-FI networks, cellular and they mostly 
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rely on edge computing in making decision at the source. Rogue data introduction could 
result in faulty sensors, which could bring about under or over watering of crops, in the 
process, destroying the crops. The same also applies to livestock herds been managed in 
farm buildings. In this scenario faulty sensors could disrupt HVAC systems, that could 
result to adverse health conditions that could result to death of the animals. 
3.2.2 Falsification of data to disrupt both crop and livestock 
 An unapproved genetic modification can cause massive economic disruption, real 
impact on food security, complex foreign trade issues. It does take quite some time and 
huge resources to confirm and control disease outbreak in livestock. It is done through field 
and laboratory work. A malicious hacker can manipulate critical data that can wipe out a 
whole herd through disease outbreak. Same scenario applies to crop as well through 
improper mixing of GMO products into the supply chain, which can result to crop diseases 
and destruction. 
3.3 Availability 
 Threat to availability is simply put the disruption of agricultural food, production 
and supply. Threat to equipment availability can result from cyber related issues and 
natural disasters. Crop and livestock operations are reliant on this equipment. Any threat to 
equipment availability can be catastrophic. 
3.3.1 Timing of Equipment Availability 
 It is to be noted that for every crop there is a window of time to plant and to harvest 
which implies also that all machinery for these operations must be in working conditions. 
Unavailability of machinery for the appropriate timing because of malicious hackers could 
be disastrous and detrimental. Equipment’s that are vulnerable to cyber-attacks can be 
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easily manipulated in their thousands at the same time, or even inappropriate patches can 
lock up machines that are supposed to be operational., resulting in downtimes. 
3.3.2 The Disruption to navigational., positioning and time systems 
 The United states protected spectrum close to the global positioning system (GPS) is 
getting overcrowded and it is been released for   5G broadband signals, with the tendency for 
signal disruption. Farmers do face signal loss because of the overcrowding. This is not good 
for precision agriculture. 
3.3.3 Disruption to communication networks 
 The agri-food industry is built on distributed sensory networks that are involved in 
data transfers of high volumes. Famers do rely on Bluetooth, Wi-Fi networks and cellular 
and USB drives to manually transfer data. It is to be noted that rural communications 
networks are major week points for precision agriculture and thus poor connectivity results. 
3.3.4 Foreign Supply Chain 
 It is important to know that foreign manufactured equipment could be remotely 
disabled in large numbers through backdoor access from firmware, through malicious code 
that is sent to the equipment during planting or harvest seasons to cause damage. 
3.4 Mitigating Cybersecurity Threats 
 Thus far, the generic approaches to addressing cybersecurity threats have been 
presented and discussed.  In the remaining sections of this chapter, the specific 
technologies and innovative solutions to dealing with these threats in the agri-food sector 
are presented. It also explores the opportunities that may be seized because these threats 
exist in the sector.   
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3.4.1 Block Chain 
 Blockchain is defined as a data structure making it possible for participants in the 
chain to create immutable ledgers to record their transactions and track their assets across 
the network (Laurence 2019).  The network assets may be tangible or intangible.  Tangible 
assets are physical goods, such as grain, livestock, trucks, etc. and intangible assets include 
branding materials, cash, intellectual property, social network, etc.). Blockchains allow its 
partners to record and track anything of value to them in a way that cannot be altered once 
it has been recorded, and in a way that is transparent to all partners. These are digital 
information that are stored in public database. They are growing list of records called 
blocks that are basically linked to Cryptography. Each block contains a cryptographic hash 
of previous block, a time stamp transaction data. The critical features of blockchain 
technology is summarized in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Key Features of Blockchain Technology 
 
Source: 101blockchains.com 
  Blockchains provide solutions for product wastage, Food fraud, supply chain 
visibility and management. It obviously does help in planning and executing of harvesting 
and storage efficiently and delivers entirely new use cases.  It is essential that blockchains 
be in place for several reasons. Block chains enable traceability in supply chains, producing 
real time logistics data accurate, with speed and security. An implemented blockchain will 
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go a long way in addressing the challenges presented above – food water, unknown origins, 
food fraud, lack of traceability, inefficient payment, lapses in policy (e.g., subsidy 
management. It allows for the development of the confidence in the knowledge that every 
asset in the supply chain, because it is linked to the IoT, can be tracked and assigned unique 
identification, recorded in the system in a way that is immutable, hack-proof and easy to 
read in a distributed ledger format. 
 These blockchain ledgers can record and update the status of crops from planting 
and harvest to storage and delivery.  They can record and update the status of livestock 
from insemination, pregnancy conditions, delivery and delivery situations, to feeding and 
delivery for processing.  That the information is tacked and recorded in an immutable 
system allows it to have the integrity regulators need to access regulatory compliance. 
It is also good to know that blockchains are based on shared ledgers or DLT (Distributed 
Ledger Technology).  DLT is one big ledger in the cloud, putting it simply. The ledger 
contains records, transaction details, and information called blocks. These blocks, as they are 
called, are immutable and tamper proof. The data in these blocks are hard to alter or hack. 
Anyone can but put anything of value on the blockchains because they are incorruptible trust. 
That is why it is possible for farmers, consumers and retailers to register and share tangible 
information with maximum safety, transparency and speed. The data that is inputted is 
visible to all the elements in the blockchain. There is the option to either approve or reject 
the information entered. Once data entered is validated, it gets recorded into blocks, which 
are then organized in blocks chronologically and cannot be altered by anyone.  This enables 
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farmers to get instant data about the seed quality or feed availability, get situation 
information on market conditions and payment completion (Zebi,2018).  
3.4.2 Back up Files 
 Ensure files are backed up regularly to prevent disaster in case of a cyber-attack. 
This is also a measure taken in case there is a successful attack that requires the cleaning of 
your whole devices to enable reload information from the storage back up.  It is important 
to always update devices. These routine updates contain patches that will fix security short 
falls. 
3.4.3 Do not open unknown emails 
 Do not open email attachments from sources that are unknown. This also applies to 
links from emails that come from unfamiliar sources. A very easy way of attack is 
pretentious emails, disguised to be coming from someone you know. It is important not to 
provide vital information to sites you do not trust. Ensure to check URL if it has the secure 
lock emblem that identifies a secure site. Make sure it has “https:// address, don’t enter 
sensitive information in a URL that only has http://. Without the (s) at the end is not safe. 
3.4.4 Run up to date antivirus software 
 Ensure to install reputable antivirus software application. It does guard against 
known attacks that are malicious. It will help to remove, detect and quarantine various 
types of malware. It is good to note that it does not function properly on zero-day exploits 
(exploits with no solution in place to resolve issue) and polymorphic viruses (uses a 
polymorphic engine to mutate while keeping the original algorithm intact. The code does 
change itself each time it runs, but the code function does not change. 
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3.4.5 Password management 
 Make sure to change default name and password that are offered when operating in 
a network environment.  Malicious hackers already know these default and password 
names. They can therefore work to access them quickly.  Ensure to change them as soon as 
possible to uniquely strong password. 
 Using a strong password makes it difficult for attackers to guess or decrypt the 
password.  Attackers may attempt to get passwords through phishing attacks and 
keylogging, surfing and mass data breaches. Keylogging is a software that tracks the 
keystrokes on a keyboard as they are entered in a covert manner.  When installed on your 
system, keylogger captures passwords as they are being entered.  SentinelOne notes that 
data breach approach to password access plain password dumps are loved by 
cybercriminals.  The strength of passwords is controlled by two requirements: difficulty to 
crack or decrypt; and easy to remember.  
 Strong passwords are those that are difficult to crack and easy to remember by the 
owner.  The observation is that the shorter the password, the easier it is for criminals to 
crack it. The figure below shows the time it takes to crack passwords given their lengths.  It 
is estimated that passwords of less than 10 characters are easy to crack. For example, a six-
character password drawn from a 74-characterset, which covers numbers, special 
characters, lower and upper cases, is crackable in less than one-twentieth of a second. 
However, a 12-digit password will take more than 854 years to crack.  Hackers use 
computers that can run automated scripts in their search for passwords. But the more 
difficult it is, the most ardent criminal recognizes the benefit-cost of undertaking these 
ventures.  
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Figure 3.2: Cracking Time by length of Password 
 
Source: Sentinelone.com  
 To defeat cybercriminals, then, passwords must have maximum entropy, and 
unique to each transaction site. Using passwords that are easy to remember but difficult to 
crack is a good rule to follow.  Difficult to crack passwords have, as noted above, 12 or 
more digits and include random combinations of letters (both upper and lower cases), 
numbers and special letters.  SentinelOne suggests that passphrases are a lot easier to 
remember and are more difficult to crack if they are structured properly. Consider the 
example they give: NotInA(1)Month=[31-Days]Of*Sundays*.  This 35-character 
passphrase and is a lot easier to remember than this 12-character string, l7aHPQ9-*=[9)(, 
which contains the same special characters. The passphrase is daunting for hackers and yet 
easy to remember. Finally, turning on two factor authentication (2FA) or similar 
authenticator protocols can improve security even when passwords are inadvertently 
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cracked. These 2FA protocols are methods that confirm identities using a combination of 
two different factors, such as something they know, something they have, or something 
they are. The commonly used is a password plus a code that the site administrator sends to 
the user via text message on their phones.  
3.4.6 Install firewall and closed unused ports 
 Firewalls help keep out some malicious traffic before they get to computer systems. 
They also restrict outbound unnecessary communications. Implementing multi-factor 
authentication, such the 2FA protocol, can make it difficult for penetration to occur through 
firewalls.  It is important to remember that attackers are very good at exploiting weak 
authentication. Monitor incoming and outgoing data: use intrusion detection and 
preventions system to monitor incoming and outgoing traffic. This will detect unusual 
traffic and block unknown suspicious IP addresses.   
 At the software level, ports identify specific processes and provides access to 
specific network services.  The most common port protocols are the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) and the User Datagram Protocol (UDP). Port numbers are associated with 
IP addresses of hosts and the protocol type.  Open ports, therefore, allow communications 
with the network to occur. When ports are not in use, it is good security practice to close 
them.  Unused ports that remain unclosed may also not be properly monitored.   
3.4.7 Employee training and education  
 There should be continuous training of employees to inform and remind them of 
current social engineering tactics and threats.  Use of VPN (Virtual private network) for 
remote login capability.  Incorporate cyber security into agri-food safety and defense 
culture. 
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3.4.8 BYOD 
 Bring your own device (BYOD) is a common practice where participants in 
meetings or working at a site or engaged in similar other activities are encouraged to bring 
their own devices, which they then connect to the network via Wi-Fi or similar 
connections.  Devices often store network information, often for the simple reason of 
reducing time and increasing convenience.  However, if those devices are compromised, 
those stored data may still be available, allowing the thieves to gain access to the network.  
These devices could be mobile phones, personal computers and tablets or storage devices 
such flash or USB drives. 
 For employees, allowing them to work on their own private devices could position 
them to have company information and data stored on those devices.  Should there be a fall 
out between them and the company, they could use the network access codes on those 
devices to penetrate the system and cause havoc.  They can copy company information, 
take photos of documents and share them or sell them to competitors, or even use them to 
black mail the company.  The 2013 case of Bradley Manning, the US military private who 
was convicted for providing vast amounts of military and diplomatic files to WikiLeaks, is 
a case in point. In his case, he felt his employer, the US Government, was not being 
transparent to the American people, and took it upon himself to leak what he considered 
embarrassing information to the public. See the report of the case by the New York Times’ 
Charlie Savage, titled “Soldier Admits Providing Files to WikiLeaks” on February 2013 at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/us/bradley-manning-admits-giving-trove-of-military-
data-to-wikileaks.html.    
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3.5 Conclusion 
 The agri-food sector is core in the American economy. While the sector faces 
numerous threats, such as production and market risks, its increasing participation in 
computer mediated information networks introduces it to newer forms of risks.  While 
these risks are not new, they are to the agri-food sector, especially its upstream components 
of commodity production.  For example, precision agriculture and other technologies, 
which involve collecting massive amounts of data from farmers and storing them in the 
cloud, present novel challenges about ownership, security, protection and access.   
Protecting the stakeholders of the agri-food sector from the threat of cyber-attacks is critical 
in ensuring the continuity of the agri-food industry. Furthermore, as stipulated in the 
recommendations above, the need for continuous education and the training of staffs cannot 
be over emphasized enough. Network device upgrades and updates are essential for the safety 
of the networks. 
 Because of the vulnerability of the agri-food industry to cyber-attacks, it is 
recommended that firms have in house trained cybersecurity professionals scouting their 
systems for weakness and maintaining their security software. There should also be both 
intrusion detection and prevention systems in place to constantly monitor network traffic 
for unusual traffic.  It is also good to know that any agri-food company that has improved 
cybersecurity measures in place, with the new technologies will have better stand against 
competitors. This will allow it to create more value for its customers and others in the 
supply chain, enabling it to enhance its competitiveness.  
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